

CLARE HEMMINGS

FEMINIST POLITICAL
AMBIVALENCE and the
IMAGINATIVE
ARCHIVE

CONSIDERING
EMMA GOLDMAN



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**NEXT WAVE:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN
WOMEN'S STUDIES**

A series edited by Inderpal Grewal,
Caren Kaplan, and Robyn Wiegman

CONSIDERING
Emma Goldman

FEMINIST POLITICAL AMBIVALENCE
& THE IMAGINATIVE ARCHIVE

CLARE HEMMINGS

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To the generous reader of the book

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Introduction

Emma Goldman was a really huge badass.

Sadly there are no surviving pictures of her riding a unicorn.

— HEXE, “ANARCHY, BDSM AND CONSENT-BASED CULTURE”

AMBIVALENT ARCHIVES

Emma Goldman (1869–1940), the larger-than-life anarchist activist and political thinker who has always inspired social movements and feminist thinking, continues to generate a hyperbolic critical response. According to Ally Fogg, writing in the *Guardian* in 2010, Goldman’s relevance for contemporary politics is unequivocal, as she “tumbles through the ages like a snowball, gathering mass and momentum with each new appreciation.” Vivian Gornick, her recent biographer, insists in the *Nation* that Goldman currently “occupies Wall Street” (2011b), while Maria Brettschneider (2013) and Bice Maiguashca (2014) situate her legacy as positively animating contemporary global justice movements. In a similar vein, Loretta Kensinger affirms Goldman’s “ability to speak across time” (2007, 280), and Goldman is frequently cited as embodying the kind of radical spirit that is most needed in the present if the political and methodological deadlock between neoliberal and socialist forces is to be broken (Loizidou 2011). Judith Butler (2011) reflects on Goldman’s value in a lecture at the New School in New York; Kathy Ferguson’s (2011b) important full-length feminist engagement with Goldman’s theoretical contributions was published in the same year, following an earlier edited collection on fem-

inist interpretations of her work (Weiss and Kensinger 2007); and in 2014, “Revolutions,” a special issue of *Feminist Review* (Andrijasevic, Hamilton, and Hemmings 2014), included discussion of Goldman’s significance in four of the five full articles.¹ To some extent, this renewed interest in Goldman mirrors a renewed political and intellectual interest in anarchism more generally over the last ten or so years,² but unlike some of the rather dour anarchist comrades with whom Goldman overlapped—Alexander Berkman, Peter Kropotkin, Voltairine de Cleyre—it is Goldman’s zeal, her ability to combine sexual and gendered politics with revolutionary international fervour, that is seized upon as essential for a contemporary radical political imagination.

The flavour of this critical and political engagement with Goldman is highly charged: it is by turns concerned to rescue Goldman from obscurity, delighted to have found the perfect heroine, and disparaging of her own myopia and inconsistency.³ It is engaged, affectively saturated, and productive of its own passionate political desires. Thus, and typically, Kensinger is “thrilled” to come across Goldman (2007, 255), and Alice Wexler describes how Goldman “captured [her] imagination” (1992, 37). As Jason Wehling notes, Goldman’s biographers find her by turns “amazing,” “inspirational,” or an “irritant,” much as friends of Goldman’s did during her lifetime (2007, 27). Those less seduced by Goldman’s charm nevertheless tend to focus on her capacity to appeal, and on what they consider the unreasonable attachments that she generated—and continues to generate—in others (e.g., Herzog 2007; Solomon 1988). In more directly relational terms, Alix Kates Shulman insists that after decades of research proximity she can confidently assert that “we’re a couple” (1984, 2), with all the ups and downs this suggests, foreshadowing Wexler’s insistence that Goldman has taken up “permanent residence in my life” (1992, 49). In effect, then, the critical archive on Goldman (particularly, but by no means exclusively, feminist) is often marked by intimacy—the desire for it, the belief one has in it—and the disappointments that go along with investing too heavily in the significance of another. While engagement with Goldman’s person and writing (her subjective archive) is central to this book, as I discuss later, so too is the engagement with her feminist interlocutors (her critical archive), as well as the theoretical archive that shapes the present.

The question of intimacy in the encounter with “the other,” particularly the historical other, in research and biography is not uniquely produced by encounters with Goldman, of course. Joan Scott asks more generally how we might account for “our attraction to (or repulsion from) specific events, philosophies [or] figures” in history (2011, 147). Thinking relationally, as many

feminist biographers and historians are apt to do, means that the “inmate relations” (Cook 1984, 398) or “flirtations” (400) that characterise this encounter are likely to be brought to the fore rather than denied. But they may still lead writers to “crystallize in their subjects unrealistic expectations about themselves and other[s]” (Ascher, DeSalvo, and Ruddick 1984, xxiii). In relation to Goldman, Wexler’s account of the forms of identification and projection that attend the biographical process is the most direct, as she describes her fantasy substitution of Goldman for her own mother, and her mother’s concomitant fight for her attention: in a rather extraordinary twist of fate, Wexler’s mother dies on the same day as Goldman some forty years later (1992, 48). For Wexler, the point of tracking this process is both to foreground subjectivity in biographical research and also to show that this is helpful in making sense of Goldman’s own “divided, conflicted subjectivity” (43).

Contemporary writers fascinated with Goldman are not alone in another way too. She has been consistently reinterpreted according to the mood of the time and the desires of the writer, as Oz Frankel (1996) has so thoroughly documented.⁴ Indeed, Goldman herself was extremely sensitive to the importance of self-fashioning for a political and critical public and also was acutely aware of her own iconic status. As her devoted archivist Candace Falk tells us, Goldman took pains to transform her lectures into pieces of political theatre, employing a range of tactics—such as chaining herself to her podium, stuffing rags in her mouth to perform censorship, and so forth (2002, 13)—to make her political messages memorable.⁵ She dramatised her politics and sensationalised her subjectivity as part of a highly developed strategy of promoting anarchism and herself as its advocate. The eloquent Christine Stansell describes Goldman’s own person as embodying “both celebrity and politics, spectacle and radicalism, universality and self-aggrandizement” (2000, 121), noting further than such liveliness resulted in her being offered a place in vaudeville (an offer she refused), as well as making her a target for the American authorities who were extremely anxious about her popularity (138).⁶ A range of writers, myself included, have embraced Goldman’s enthusiasm and tenacity through characterising them as “passion” (Hemmings 2012b, 2014b; Rogness and Foust 2011),⁷ yet this has also been a technique through which her contributions as a serious political theorist have been dismissed (see Weiss and Kensinger 2007).

The tension between a critical desire for Goldman and her own awareness and exploitation of this desire can be seen in the use of the diminutive to refer to her. The more attached to Goldman critics are, the more likely they

are to want to demonstrate their intimacy with her through use of first name terms. Thus for Falk, Goldman is “feisty-edgy Emma” (2007, 43), and for Jamie Heckert while “Butler may have taught” us certain things (2012, 73) and “Rosenberg offers . . .” contemporary anarchists certain insights, it is “Emma” who “has called us to be, to feel” (71). The special issue of *Social Anarchism* on Goldman is straightforwardly titled “It’s All about Emma,” and within its pages Kathryn Rosenfeld (2004–5) reflects on the importance for her and her friends of asking playfully “What would Emma do?” when faced with hard political or intellectual choices, while Sharon Presley (2004–5) takes up a “complex” Emma to rally a contemporary activist audience to be more daring. Other writers move more fluidly between “Emma” and “Goldman,” as Cyril Greenland (2002) does in his funny and moving account of his childhood encounters with Goldman, Marie Stopes, and Margaret Sanger, and as Loizidou does in the acknowledgements to her edited collection on contemporary disobedience (2013, viii). Still others use the diminutive “Emma” in a familiar way to contrast with the sterner use of surnames for men, as John Ward does in his relentless counterposing of “Emma” and “Berkman” in his introduction to *Prison Memoirs of an Anarchist* (1970), and as Richard Drinnon and Anna Maria Drinnon do through their important collection of letters between these two comrades, *Nowhere at Home* (1975). Such a contrast draws on and reproduces a long history of diminishing women’s achievements, marking “Emma” rather than “Berkman” as uncitable in the canon of political theory, and as less serious or challenging in her own time. It smacks of the long history of use of gendered diminutives—referring to women as “girls” or “pets”—and thoroughly domesticates the one thus described. But this is not something *other people* do, or that is the preserve only of thoughtless men or misogynists: as the preceding references quite clearly indicate, feminist and queer scholars also frame Goldman as a personal friend or confidante. And, indeed, in my own notes on her work and secondary sources I refer to Goldman variously as “Emma” or “EG,” sometimes catching myself and inserting a more respectful “Goldman.” The formal citation could be seen as marking an attempt, perhaps, to restore the distance that I otherwise find impossible to keep.

Importantly, Goldman also refers to *herself* as “E.G.,” recognising the playful ways the contraction allows her to be exemplary or anonymous as well as informal. In a letter to Warren Starr Van Valkenburgh in 1916, Goldman notes that her friend may have difficulty getting his work on birth control published less because of its content and more because it “deals with E.G.,” highlighting that she knows full well how she is framed for media and political

community alike. As Falk notes, this serendipitous ability to make herself exemplary through her name facilitated Goldman's self-representation as "above conflict" too (2002, 17), as representative of anarchism rather than one among a range of its interpreters. Goldman often signed herself "E.G." in letters to friends (including to her lifelong friend and anarchist comrade, Alexander Berkman), clearly enjoying the pun (Drinnon and Drinnon 1975). Ferguson also reminds her readers that Goldman took the name "E. G. Smith" as a cover when she went underground after being associated with Leon Czolgosz's assassination of President William McKinley in 1901 (2011b, 300–305). So while our current critical and political attachments to Goldman are frequently demonstrated by a desire to suture ourselves to her), Goldman herself has often already anticipated that desire, playing with it, or mobilising it strategically to her own (or political) advantage. It is not just our own need for Goldman that catapults her across the ages to take her place as an exemplar of passionate radicalism, then, but her self-fashioning as an available figure in this dynamic.

I raise these intersubjective issues at the start of this book to foreground the dynamic nature of historical encounters and to flag the affective investments we all—critics and readers alike—have in a self-consciously charismatic figure such as Goldman. That relationship is never a neutral one, and this book centres Goldman as the point of attachment through which I explore several related aspects of contemporary feminist and queer historiography and politics. I argue that the uncertainty that characterises feminist and queer understandings of gender, race, and sexuality in the present is easily obscured through propositions of certainty about precisely these central concerns. In imagining that we know how to ameliorate gendered, racial, and sexual inequalities, or indeed what gender, race, and sexuality *are*, it is easy to miss the profound ambivalence about these terms and the inequalities or pleasures that cluster around them. That ambivalence is in fact fundamental to both the past and the present. It animates political struggles over and with precisely those objects we imagine we inherit as knowable, and it runs back and forth across time to challenge progress or loss narratives about where we come from and what political terrain we occupy now.⁸ Attending to ambivalence as a continuous political and affective reality for those who want to intervene in gendered, raced, and sexual meanings and structures in order to ameliorate their harms shifts the nature of historical and contemporary inquiry. This approach refuses a political teleology that laments the loss of Left solidarity, for example, or one that straightforwardly

celebrates an increasing integration of race within feminist or queer theory. It runs counter to a rights-based approach that characterises the twentieth century as one of increased recognition (or a lament about lack of recognition, or misrecognition), focusing attention instead on what is lost through a politics of certainty. What is gained from embracing a politics of ambivalence is a view of the past and present that centres both psychic and social aspects of inequality, the tenacity of our attachments to the objects that poison our lives, to paraphrase Lauren Berlant (2011), and an opportunity to engage in the struggle over what inequality is and how best to intervene to transform it. It tries to imagine inhabiting a reality as well as politics of ambivalence, and foregrounds the importance of affect as a guide to asking important political and theoretical questions. But if the past and present of feminist and queer politics are marked by ambivalence, then what tools do we need to take up in order to glimpse that past and make it fit for present purposes? How can political ambivalence be animated to ameliorate rather than increase inequality, and how will a critic or audience know the difference?⁹

Goldman is my guide in this project for several reasons that relate to the different archival contexts that frame her for a contemporary audience.¹⁰ Firstly, there is the *subjective archive* of Goldman herself: her writing (published and unpublished); her letters to others and theirs to her; her actions and autobiography; the hopes and fears that trickle down to us in the tone of that contradictory archive and in its inevitable absences. Goldman was both a fervent and lifelong advocate of revolution—not a position we readily associate with ambivalence—and a person who struggled with all orthodoxies (including her own ideals). *Struggle* to articulate the unknown but to commit to it nevertheless could in fact be said to characterise her sexual politics as a whole. In this book, I bring forward the Goldman archive as a way of foregrounding these struggles over the meaning of key concepts we have inherited as ways of entering politics—gender, race, and sexuality—at one particular moment of their (revolutionary) articulation. In the process, I ask what it means to include Goldman in a feminist or queer history without wanting to clean her up first. And, of course, too, in the process, I hope to introduce Goldman's energetic theorising to a broader audience and through a particular lens.¹¹

Secondly, I am interested in tracking the *critical archive* engaged with Goldman, as I have already begun to do in this introduction to the project. That archive forms itself through loops and folds, by turns uncovering Goldman, yet then burying her amid a sequence of affective and theoretical presump-

tions, or indeed forgetting her altogether. What do we learn about both Goldman's archive and the theoretical and political present when we attend to the critical archive as itself structured through ambivalence? Here I want to think through the question of historical inquiry and investment as an affective dynamic as well as a process of patient interrogation and investigation. My own and other critics' cleaving to or distance from Goldman's person or thought produces a rich archive to explore how we might manage our own ambivalence as well as hers. What we want to bring forward from Goldman's oeuvre or time and what we want to leave behind tell us something important about our present interests and political attachments. Central to this project, then, is a methodology that draws on my own and others' affective ambivalence as a way into thinking about the problems of the equally ambivalent political and theoretical present. I explore these aspects of methodology in more detail later, but for now I want to emphasise that understanding this process of engagement as an affective one recasts history (and historical research) as a dynamic that is alive, filled with political and personal yearning, and—importantly—not fully in this or any other writer's control. Goldman's subjective archive is not a dead set of texts that we deliberate over in the safety of our own time and space. Goldman jumps across that false distance to poke me, mock my presumptions, and fill me with longing. If the past and present are suffused with ambivalence, in other words, so too is the method of putting them in conversation with one another. My third archive, the *theoretical archive*, thus includes the set of presumptions and practices that frame what can be included as part of a feminist or queer project in the present. This archive includes understandings of what counts as "gender equality" (as well as how to achieve it), what "sexual politics" can or cannot include, and the place of "race" in a contemporary political imaginary. At heart it concerns the feminist and queer conversations that I see Goldman as speaking back to, intervening in, and at points radically reshaping. My access to this archive is of course fundamentally partial (since it is vast) and is enabled through my engagement with the critical Goldman archive as well as Goldman's own oeuvre. Attention to the critical archive gives me a sense of what it is that contemporary theorists—myself included—can bring forward or must leave to one side (or else not remain comfortable), and shifts our sense of the present to include its theoretical underbelly. What does the interplay between the visible and the buried of a contemporary terrain enable as part of a feminist politics of ambivalence going forward?

This project is thus not a great-person history with Goldman at its cen-

tre. It is not primarily an attempt to position Goldman as a lost foremother of a feminist or queer project that is necessarily the worse for ignoring her, although she most certainly did not like to be ignored. In that respect, I do not seek in this book to provide a full or final account of her life and work, or even of their foundational importance for contemporary theory and politics, although these aspects certainly have their moments in the book. But neither is Goldman an accidental choice, of course. It is her own *fervent ambivalence* about issues I hold dear in my own present, her consistent attention to questions of difference, and her failure to resolve the problematics that govern those questions that have drawn me to Goldman. So too it is her presence as a powerful figure in my own life (much as for Wexler), coming in and out of it at different moments, that makes me want to engage her in a conversation, the direction of which I am not fully able to anticipate. It is my feeling for Goldman and my enjoyment of her person and polemic that have opened up a range of theoretical and political questions for me about ambivalence at a variety of levels. It is in and through my attachment to her that I have come to imagine the past and present differently and to see that ambivalence might also be inhabited with “panache.”¹²

My three archives—subjective, critical, and theoretical—are of course not always separate or separable. They interlock as we read Goldman’s work and interpret what she says in ways that make sense for us in context. And they point us to another archive, the one that has yet to be written or read: the *imaginative archive*. As I detail later, this archive is extremely important in articulating a feminist politics of ambivalence, insofar as it foregrounds the gaps and fissures in the existing archives and positions the historian as a deeply serious writer and reader of fiction. That archive represents the straining to hear the voices that have never been heard, the attachments that cannot be given meaning, and the utopian desire for another future grounded in a different past. In this respect, my fourth archive might of course be said to be an anarchist, prefigurative one. It grapples with the relationship between the dead and the living in order to enact the future one wants to bring about in the present.¹³ It prioritises subjective and collective responsibility to generate living alternatives to the deadening modes of representation we see around us. For me, this means that I have to take very seriously my conversation with Goldman not only in terms of how I represent her or engage her thinking for a contemporary audience but also in terms of how that representation contributes to what collaborators of mine have termed “the living archive.”¹⁴ Rather than provide a biographical sketch or account of Goldman’s life as a preamble

to my thinking with and through the “Goldman archives,” I want instead to integrate my introduction of her to you into my fuller account of the book’s ambitions. While perhaps frustrating for a reader not familiar with Goldman’s life, writing, or politics, this approach is consistent with the book’s interest in understanding the writing of history as a dynamic one, and the desire to know the other as animated by one’s own location. I seek here to make those framings explicit rather than imagining a “neutral Goldman” I could present to you at the outset.¹⁵

FEMINIST ATTACHMENTS

A friend gave me a picture of Emma Goldman when I was seventeen years old, and in it she is only a few years older than I was then. The picture shows her meeting the camera’s gaze face on, chin up slightly, hair pulled back, an uncomfortable-looking dress covering her slight frame. At the time I knew nothing of the importance of Goldman’s image as part of how people tried to make sense of her; I was simply captivated by the mismatch between “anarchist” and “young woman” that the picture represented. I bought Goldman’s autobiography, *Living My Life* (1931b, 1931c), and found out that this Jewish Russian woman had migrated to America when a teenager, moved to New York City as soon as she could escape her family and early marriage in upstate New York, and by her late twenties had become the “High Priestess of Anarchy” (*Chicago Inter Ocean* 1908, 284). I was in awe of this young woman who had travelled across America lecturing on anarchist revolution, minority creativity, sexual politics, and state violence, and whose refusal to misrepresent herself or her cause meant repeated prison terms. I felt her loss when her lifelong friend and comrade, Alexander Berkman, was imprisoned for his failed attempt on the life of Henry Clay Frick, and her fear when she was blamed for radicalising Leon Czolgosz, President McKinley’s assassin (Goldman 1901). I entertained fantasies of refusing to recognise the authorities at the Church of England private school where I was a sixth-former, but knew I would not be able to sustain any such “revolution” beyond its initial frisson of transgression. Instead, I marvelled at Goldman’s standoff with J. Edgar Hoover, broken only by her being stripped of citizenship and deported to a postrevolutionary Russia (Berkman and Goldman 1919). I appreciated the prescience of her critiques of the new Russian state authority, its violence and exclusion, and her disappointment at its failed postrevolutionary project, as well as the International Left’s myopia (Goldman 1925b). In part, I relished this critique because it resonated with my own youthful 1980s, Thatcher-inspired

anticommunism, in contrast to Alice Wexler, who is outraged by Goldman's perpetuation of the "Bolshevik myth" (1992, 44), writing from her own location as a frustrated American leftist in the same time period.¹⁶

Forced and chosen travels through Europe in the 1920s were by turns clear sources of frustration and pleasure for Goldman, as she struggled to find a place to belong: part of her remained forever attached to America, its newness perhaps mirroring her own youth and optimism while there.¹⁷ The difficulties that Goldman experienced travelling across borders and her frequent disappointments in comrades (that pepper her autobiography and letters) were ameliorated by moments of intimacy and solidarity. She married Welsh miner James Colton for papers, her complicated friendship with Berkman remained strong, and she continued to pursue lust and love despite recurrent heartbreak. For a seventeen-year-old who dreamed of similar (literary and intimate, if not political) comradeship, what was not to like in this tale of thwarted ambitions and heroism? I later read in letters of her frequent illness and loneliness (Drinnon and Drinnon 1975), her misery after Berkman's death in the south of France (where she wrote her autobiography), and her doubts about the value of anarchist revolution. Despite viewing her as being on the wrong side of history and progress, I embraced what John Chalberg suggests is her "American individualism" (1991), agreeing with her sense that against the odds her life had indeed been "worth while" (Goldman 1933b). I too wanted a life filled with ups and downs, a heroic life, and I sighed with satisfaction at Goldman's autobiographical conclusion that she had lived hers "in bitter sorrow and ecstatic joy, in black despair and fervent hope. I had drunk the cup to the last drop" (1931c, 993).

But what truly caught me in Goldman's life and work, and that pulled me into reading *Anarchism and Other Essays* (1910) from start to finish one wet weekend, was the particular combination of her sexual politics and her disidentification from contemporary feminism. In alignment with my right-wing Thatcherite commitments, I was also rather virulently antifeminist myself at the time of this encounter, taking enormous pleasure in scoffing at attempts to give women or girls what I saw as "special attention." I was a perfect audience for Goldman's scathing indictments of both bourgeois femininity and dusty, censorious feminism (1910, particularly 167–211). Goldman reflected back to me my youthful interest in fashioning myself as an assertive subject, capable of anything, not to be cowed by norms as foolish as those that govern gender or sexuality. And of course, the ease with which I aligned her arguments and affect with my right-wing antifeminism is part of what alerted me more

recently to the problematic nature of such attacks on the ills of femininity, as I discuss later.

When I was coming to the end of my last book some twenty-five years later, and was sifting through my mind for a new focus, Goldman kept coming back to me. I rummaged around to find that old image of her (that I had apparently never thrown away), and as I looked at it, I was captivated anew. We might say that I am now surely as invested in feminism as once I was hostile towards it. Yet that *captivation* echoes between these politically distinct selves to suggest something affectively common to both that has inaugurated this project. Both my younger and my older selves are suspicious of feminist projects that characterise women as in need of protection; both hold no truck with naturalised accounts of femininity or masculinity; both share an existentialist vision of a degendered human capacity that must surely lie at the heart of any real cultural and political transformation. My older self has come to align these critiques with both Left and feminist commitments, but I suspect that my younger self was more comfortable with the ambivalence of uncharted sexual and gendered territory.

The Goldman archive is overflowing with ambivalence about gender and sexuality, in ways that may initially come as a surprise. After all, this is Emma Goldman, who is unequivocal about the central role that sexual politics and the gendered division of labour and value play in the perpetuation of capitalist and militarist interests. Goldman spent her life foregrounding the inequalities attending and reinforcing women's subordinate role and was still making arguments about the importance of women as revolutionaries in her late sixties, when she was active in supporting the anarchist movement in Spain (Ackelsberg 2001; *Spain and the World* 1937). Goldman insisted that women's position in the family was a fundamental feature of how capitalism worked (rather than its lamentable side effect), emphasising the importance of the exploitation of their reproductive labour, as well as the impact of this tyranny on women as individuals. She was an early advocate of women's birth control, for which she was imprisoned (Goldman 1916b). Goldman railed against the ills of femininity that keep women locked into domestic servitude (1897a, 1911) and was forthright on the centrality of women's emancipation to social and political transformation (1906b). It was, in fact, precisely because Goldman wanted to centre women's freedom as essential for revolution that she was so critical of suffrage and the limits of efforts to gain the franchise (1917d). For Goldman, only women's fullest liberty would do, and she understood state-oriented recognition politics such as the claiming of the vote as a waste

of revolutionary energy. In this she was not alone, of course: women's sexual and political freedom was consistently contrasted with the red herring of feminism or equality in a range of international anarchist movements (Hutchison 2001; Molyneux 1986).

The feminist critical archive has sought to rescue Goldman from this “splitting” at the heart of her revolutionary project on women by declaring that she is in fact a feminist, despite her resistance to the name. Feminist writers consistently claim her as such on the basis of these radical views of women's emancipation (Falk 2007; Kensinger 2007) and provide a series of caveats to reframe her antipathy to feminism as of her time and politics, rather than something to worry about too much in bringing her forward (Shulman 1982). Alternatively, feminist critics point to her own failed project of sexual freedom as a good example of all feminists' failure to achieve our ideals, citing her anxiety-producing level of devotion to male lovers (Marso 2003) and her lack of attention to divisions of domestic labour (Stansell 2000, 258) as aspects of her (still feminist) complexity that we can usefully learn from. Goldman's rather frequent unpleasantness to women is harder to integrate into this claiming of her as a feminist, though. While most feminist thinking includes a critique of femininity and of (some) women in their representation and reproduction of the status quo, Goldman is understood to take her judgements too far in this respect. She can be vitriolic towards women (representing them as stupid, vicious, petty, and corrupt), and—probably more importantly—she clearly takes great pleasure in her characterisation of bourgeois women as arch consumers and of women in general as responsible for many of men's failings (1931c, 556). As I explore in the next chapter, it is Goldman's enthusiastic antipathy towards femininity that signals her ambivalence about women's capacity to change in the subjective archive, while in the critical archive, it is the faltering desire for Goldman to be a feminist and the difficulties of succeeding in that endeavour that are instructive. In wanting Goldman to *be* a feminist in order to claim her as valuable to a feminist project, I will be suggesting that contemporary feminist theory seeks to mask its own ambivalence about precisely these same—and unresolved—questions about femininity and feminism.

Goldman's ambivalence about femininity resonates with the feminist archive's concerns, but her ambivalence about race and racism is harder for the archive to negotiate. If the feminist critical archive has been keen to claim Goldman as a feminist despite her strong disidentification from feminism, it stumbles when confronted with her aggressive characterisations of the ills

of femininity, as I have suggested. In relationship to race and racism, feminists have noted with some dismay that Goldman “misses race” (Ferguson 2011b, 217–29), and to some extent they respond in a similar vein, ignoring the dilemmas that run through the subjective archive, claiming her instead as an intersectional heroine before her time. This is commonly achieved by focusing on her internationalism, Jewish identity, and community attachments (Reizenbaum 2005; Wexler 1992) and her focus on migration and antinationism (Kennedy 1999), which certainly were strong features of Goldman’s politics. Yet in the process of this reclamation effort, Goldman’s reflections on race and racism, her attempts to integrate class and race analysis, her comparisons between anti-Semitic and antiblack violence in America (Goldman 1910, 69–78; Goldman 1927, in Drinnon and Drinnon 1975, 196), as well as her development of a “post-racial” model of kinship (Goldman between 1927 and 1930), receive less attention than I think they deserve. In wanting Goldman to be attentive to race and racism in ways that are familiar to contemporary feminist theorising, the critical archive deflects attention from the ways in which Goldman negotiates these questions in conflicting and conflicted ways. In the process, and as I argue more fully in chapter 2, that critical archive also protects a contemporary fantasy that questions of race and racism *can* be straightforwardly integrated as part of an intersectional analysis. In the attempt to present contemporary feminist theory both as attentive to race and as knowing what that attention should involve, the ongoing ambivalence about the relationship between race, class, gender, and sexuality in the theoretical archive is minimised if not directly repressed. As with attention to ambivalence about femininity and feminism, however, a more open approach to *what race is and means* might enable a politics more attuned to the continued uncertainty about the relationship between race and class, and point to ways in which a fuller analysis of sexual freedom challenges the nationalist and racialised understanding of “the family.”

To give a little more detail of these threads here, and to flesh out our initial encounter with Goldman, we should note first that Goldman was indeed a practical and intuitive internationalist. She herself migrated or was exiled numerous times during her lifetime, and she had a trenchant critique of the relationship between nationalism, militarism, and capitalism, particularly insofar as these limited the possibilities for women to live full lives (1908b, 1915). She was thus a supporter of the Indian anticolonial movement (Elam 2013) and the Mexican Revolution (Falk 2012b) and worked towards “solidarity with anti-colonial struggles in Africa and the Philippines” (Bertalen 2011, 225). Gold-

man was of course one of those anarchist migrants who became politicised after her move from Russia to the United States, and who was first educated in and then exiled to Europe (Goldman 1931b, 1931c). She fought to make anarchism a broader movement in the United States once she had converted to anarchism by lecturing in English rather than Yiddish or German as was the convention among New York anarchists in the 1880s and 1890s (Stansell 2000). She wrote to comrades and intimates all over the world no matter where she was living, and she participated in that vast network of transnational anarchist publication and translation that typified its vibrancy. As Falk thus notes, for Goldman “the crossing of national boundaries, so integral to Goldman’s political vision was also critical to the long-term impact of her political work” (2005, 64). Goldman’s border crossings and lack of belonging underwrite her challenges to patriotism and capitalism, as well as the gendered and sexual norms that secure them, and these skeins of her life resonate well with a feminist critical and theoretical archive that foregrounds a transnational feminist politics attentive to contemporary geopolitical complexity.

It is certainly true that Goldman, like many other European, Latin American, and American anarchists, was less clear on how to negotiate race politics. For Ferguson, Goldman’s political commitments meant that “she was confident that class would always trump race in the production of social inequality” (2011b, 220), and for Falk, while Goldman had a clear analysis of lynching as “the most graphic and egregious expression of racist terrorism in the country,” she did not theorise that horror as “the focus of her general critique” of state aggression (2012b, 12n33). Yet what interests me about this critical engagement is that this focus in Goldman is framed as self-evidently problematic, as clearly erroneous if not privileging race and racism. As a result of this critical “embarrassment” about how she “misses” race, a range of ways in which Goldman *does* explore how racism functions as a form of oppression are easily missed in turn. In wanting Goldman’s attention to race to be familiar and privileged, the attention that she pays to lynching and her analysis of the concept of “slavery” are glossed over. And in turning to her critiques of nationalism, or the mobilisation of Jewish identity as an alternative, in framing her as an intersectional heroine ahead of her time (*despite* this inattention to race and racism), the very ways in which these approaches combine to provide a somewhat unexpected account of race and sexual freedom, or analysis of the relationship between anti-Semitic and anti-black violence, are also too easily overlooked.

In chapter 3 I explore the question—Goldman’s and mine too—of sex-

ual freedom as an antidote to a revolutionary theory and method that relies on the gendering of a public/private divide, and on the racialisation of reproduction and kinship. Goldman was among those early twentieth-century anarchists and socialists who understood sexual expression to be a “basic human right, a legitimate goal of the class struggle” (Snitow, Stansell, and Thompson 1983, 18). Indeed, Goldman’s centring of sexual freedom at the heart of her revolutionary vision forms part of a long tradition of engagement with sexual politics on the Left, one that endeavours to make sense of how productive and reproductive labour come together and to identify the difference between sexual freedom and capitalist co-optation at both practical and theoretical levels. Goldman theorises the sexual division of labour not simply as a prior condition for production and thus capitalist exploitation but *as labour* (alienated and exploited, as is other labour in capitalism), and thus an integral part of economic production.¹⁸ Through this analysis, Goldman links birth control issues, prostitution, and wholesale destruction of the poor in wartime and develops her strong arguments for love as the site of reclaimed value, creativity, and progressive possibility when returned into the hands of its workers: women. Goldman not only theorised sexual freedom, of course, but also practiced it through her life, refusing to be domestically tied to men or children, and struggling with the contradictions between feelings and politics that structure her bravery in this respect (Goldman 1931b, 1931c). Of particular interest to me are the ways in which Goldman’s embrace of sexual freedom as both means towards and end of an anarchist utopia (L. Davis 2011) interrupts the temporal features that govern a more conventional rendering of the relationship of sexuality and capitalism, and suggests alternate ways of understanding and writing that history.

Goldman’s investment in sexual freedom as revolutionary could be seen as a useful intervention in the long-standing political and critical opposition between “the cultural” and “the material,” in this respect. Sexuality has consistently been associated with superficiality and “leisure” rather than the serious business of politics, a view that relies of course on the naturalisation of heterosexual family formations (Freccero 2012; Hennessy 2014; Parker 1993). It has been understood (as part of identity politics) as contributing to the fragmentation of the Left, and in academic terms as part of the “cultural turn” that has abandoned materiality.¹⁹ As suggested, Goldman herself was extraordinarily clear that for women sexuality *is* labour, without which what is more properly thought of as “production” could have little purchase (1916c). She was convinced that there could be no real transformation of so-

cial or economic relations without a prior revaluation of sexual subjectivity for both men and women (*St. Louis Post-Dispatch* 1908) and was persuaded of the creative potential of noninstitutionalised sexual expression, including homosexuality, despite her own uncertain feelings on the question.²⁰ Goldman would certainly have had no truck with arguments that sexuality is “merely cultural” (Butler 1997; Fraser 1997), but she would also have wasted no time highlighting the many ways sexuality is intimately part of—rather than only a critique of—capitalism.²¹ I can see her now (tumbling through time), arriving at a *Marxism Today* conference in East London and expressing her dumbfounded rage at the proposition that sexuality is not central to political economy, citing the history of continuous debate over these issues as coextensive with rather than fragmenting of anarchist and socialist fervour. I can see her travelling to a queer conference on the Eastern Seaboard (persuading all the other sea-bound passengers of the significance of anarchism by the time she arrived), thumping the platform in rage at the idea that sexuality could ever be separated from class analysis or nationalist interests, and cheering the interventions of queer Marxists. But I can also hear her laughing her head off en route to Amsterdam at the thought that homosexuality could paradoxically be reduced to its homonormative or homonationalist modes, insisting instead on the creative potential of all sexual feeling once truly free.²²

The feminist critical archive on Goldman’s understanding of sexual freedom is of course seduced by that centring of sexual politics as both means and end of utopia, and by Goldman’s linking of nationalism, militarism, and control of women’s bodies. Her support for and theorisation of prostitution as an effect of capitalism, migration, and repressed sex drives has pleased queer theorists too, as has her sometimes contradictory support for homosexual liberty. But so, too, that archive finds limits to this privileging of sexual freedom, representing it as too vague, on the one hand, and too excessively focused on love for men, on the other (Marso 2003, 306; Stansell 2000, 142). Bonnie Haaland (1993) perhaps goes furthest in this line of thinking, framing Goldman as a heterosexual essentialist because of her support for sexological and psychoanalytic understandings of sexuality, as well as her uncertain relationship to homosexuality. But a range of different thinkers celebrate Goldman’s bold relationship to sexual freedom in her life and work, while also remaining dubious about her claiming of sexuality as the core of human nature, whatever its object choice (Day 2007, 110; Lumsden 2007, 45). It is important, I think, to consider the ways in which Goldman is interrogating the question of sexuality’s relationship to capitalism and freedom at a point when sexu-

ality as an identity is in the very process of being articulated. Goldman is forging her own theory of sexual freedom as a difficult and contested rather than *self-evident* position of critique or transformation. In addition, Goldman's complex engagement with sexual politics (in theory and in practice) poses an important challenge to assumptions about the nature of sexual identity and freedom in the present. As I explore in chapter 2, Goldman's support for birth control positions her in an ambivalent relationship to eugenics in her own time, and in chapter 3 her claiming of "nature" as central to sexual freedom returns us to concerns about racialisation, insofar as she links this to primitive drives. But so, too, Goldman's ambivalence about homosexuality (her own as well as other people's) moves us firmly away from both single-issue and identity politics that govern and limit contemporary understandings of sexual rights. As in my readings of subjective, critical, and theoretical archival ambivalence concerning femininity and feminism, and race and internationalism, my interest here is in the consequences of taking Goldman's sexual ambivalence seriously as politically and historiographically significant for queer feminist studies today.

The question of methodology is particularly central to my engagement with Goldman's (and the critical and theoretical archives') understanding of sexual freedom. On the one hand, I am advocating an approach that reads for ambivalence across these archives; on the other, I am aware that in relationship to sexual freedom in particular, that same question of ambivalence can easily be obscured. The clear emergence of sexual identities through the twentieth century and the contemporary foregrounding of rights over freedoms in political contexts actively work against reading for ambivalence. The task is thus a politically motivated one that starts from an interest in what is left out of the frame, and how to think from the (nonidentitarian) margins in the spirit of Goldman's own contradictory, anarchist interventions around sexual freedom. These questions of *how* to explore ambivalence in the interlocked set of archives I draw on throughout this book are central to the later chapters of the book, in particular. Moving on from the question of sexual freedom and "nature" in Goldman's work, I intervene in the question of how to *represent* a politics of ambivalence when its traces have effectively been erased. Drawing on the imaginative tactics of postcolonial writers and artists in particular, and as I explore more fully later, I write Goldman's sexual ambivalence into the archive where it does not currently exist.

Throughout this book I centre tensions in Goldman's thinking and in the critical and theoretical archives I am concerned with, rather than seeking to

resolve them. I believe that it is more helpful to contemporary queer feminist theory to bring forward Goldman's ambivalence than to import the aspects of thinking and living that most clearly fit with the (often misplaced) certainties of the present. A sustained focus on ambivalence helps us to engage past politics and theory as complex or contradictory, and to foreground the importance of current complexity, despite our desire to have resolved both past and present paradoxes. For in relationship to the key areas raised thus far, feminist theory most certainly has not resolved the question of judgement of femininity or the relationship between feminism and its conflicted subjects; the relationship between race, migration, class, and gender in the present is less easily articulated than current intersectional approaches might perhaps have us believe; and yet faith in human nature remains central to political hope. From a deep engagement with her own thinking and its context, I want to bring forward Goldman theoretically, politically, and perhaps most importantly, methodologically. I want to engage her in order to disrupt the relationship between past and present, to challenge a critical certainty that there is a singular story that we can tell about how we got to where we (think we) are now. I want to read with and in tension with Goldman to allow her to shine, and I want to demonstrate that how we approach the past—and the throng that peoples it—raises a host of ethical and methodological questions about knowledge and politics. In addition, I want the reader to *feel* something: something that sparks an expanded sense of political thinking, perhaps, or a connection to past rebellion that lives in the imaginative present, a sense of possibility from sitting with the sounds of the dead one can never quite hear. For me, reading with Goldman these past few years has provoked at least some of these feelings; and it has additionally confirmed my sense that queer feminist thinking is always in process, never finally achieved, and never sutured to a singular political or intellectual trajectory.

DYNAMIC HISTORIES

If the subjective, critical, and theoretical archives I am engaged with here are ones that I am framing through their ambivalence, then I also need an appropriate approach to the work of teasing out that ambivalence, historically and contemporarily. For this reason, and because I also believe in the spirit of the engagement with Goldman herself, my methodology throughout the book is somewhat unorthodox. It centres the relationship between my own desires for a politics of ambivalence and Goldman's unresolved ambivalence on the issues sketched out in the previous section, and in that sense mirrors

the dynamics that I have been teasing out between the different archives thus far. It considers my relationship to Goldman as an active one in which I attach to her through a yearning for a different past, present, and future than the ones I see writ large. That yearning positions me rather oddly in relation to the archive, of course, because part of that affective relationship to Goldman longs for and imagines the parts that are missing as much as it sits with those we have. It hopes against hope that there will indeed be surviving pictures of her riding a unicorn. And that yearning also positions me as engaging a lively, resistant Goldman who seems far from dead as I seek to represent aspects of her that continue to elude me.

I have presented several papers on this question of the affective motor of the historical dynamics I am interested in in this vein, and on several occasions historians in the room have found the exploration of my affectively saturated bonds disconcerting at best, or, on occasion, plainly outrageous. A common response to my interest in thinking about Goldman as inhabiting and generating ambivalences about sexual politics, for example, has been that this is not an acceptable historical approach, which should restrict itself to the available sexual terms and meanings circulating at the time. Certainly, I agree that contextualisation of Goldman's understanding of sexual freedom is extremely important, and have sought to ensure that my engagements with her theorisations and political efforts have situated her in her own context as far as possible. But I am also not a historian, and it is less Goldman's *time* that interests me than it is Goldman's fierce expressions of resistance to the *restrictions* of her time, and her optimism about a future that she brought into her own present without fully knowing its contours. I firmly believe—as Goldman did—that there are people in all times and places whose paths through the world and political or intersubjective imaginations allow them to exceed the historical contexts that they are nevertheless rooted in. Goldman was of the opinion that this was true of both Walt Whitman (Goldman n.d. [1991b]) and Mary Wollstonecraft (Wexler 1981), and I consider this to be true of Goldman herself. For me, Goldman's own commitments to an anarchist method of living the utopian future in the present, her centring of sexual politics as part of that revolutionary scrambling of time, and her inability to articulate her own desires in available terms produce a kind of excess of meaning that marks her presence in the world. What does it mean to “contextualise” such a figure, one who pushes and pushes against the boundaries of the known and knowable in her own time? It is a longing to trace that *excess* that motivates my interest in Goldman, and although I know that it is impossible

to represent her sometimes inarticulate fervency, this increases rather than decreases my desire to do so. In this sense, then, my historiographic and political commitments are to exploring the resonance between invested parties, despite knowing that Goldman is dead, and despite knowing that my embodied desires to reanimate her fevered uncertainties may finally describe my own foolishness.

Such foolish yearning departs from earlier concerns of mine with resisting corrective histories of feminist theory and politics in *Why Stories Matter* (Hemmings 2011). I had thought—and in many ways still do—that to centre a key figure from the past as resolving the problematics of the present risks drawing a single teleological line from past to present in ways that tend to ignore what is excluded by or from that account. But in this project, I am less interested in the multiple pasts that an attention to feminist theory's exclusions reveals, and more in the continued desire for a corrective vision that motivates most radical history even when it is the object of critique. So I remain committed to telling stories otherwise, rather than only trying to tell different stories, as a way of interrupting singular histories and presents. But so, too, Goldman's *presence*, her resistance to interpretation, the difference of her thinking that cannot only be harnessed to my particular ends, stubbornly inserts itself into this project. I have a relationship with Goldman, a set of psychic and affective attachments to her that locate me in particular ways and that are not only one-sided. So while I want to tell a story of contemporary queer feminist theory with anarchist ambivalence about sexual, gendered, and race politics at its heart, I also want to do justice to the subjective archive in ways that refuse to abstract it from Goldman herself. Throughout this book, then, and as I explore more fully later, it is the *pull* of the corrective that draws me back into the past and present of queer feminism, that lures me into imagining and knowing something else. As Victoria Browne (2014) notes in her review of *Why Stories Matter*, this earlier work underestimated that pull. It is in returning to that question that my understanding of feminist historiography as a dynamic I am not fully in control of has emerged more fully. Without it, I argue, the future comes to seem as bleak as any singular past we may risk inheriting. As suggested, then, while this project is a long way from being “a great-person history,” it remains one with Goldman's complex person at its heart.

The question of historical endeavour as political and intersubjective, as concerned with desire and fantasy, has long been a feature of feminist, lesbian and gay, queer, and postcolonial approaches to the past.²³ Here I want to think through some of these traditions as a way of fleshing out the concerns I have

sketched here, and as a way of introducing a further set of reflections on attention to what *eludes* the historian's gaze as equally central to the dynamics of this project. As suggested earlier, a politicised history is always concerned with a desire for something different: a different legacy or a different future. Indeed, the longing for a past one can live with might be said to have inaugurated historical work within the crosscutting interdisciplinary fields of feminist, lesbian and gay, and postcolonial studies. The impulse is an extremely important one. It marks a difference between dominant characterisations of history and marginal subjects' own lives and meanings, and gives preferential value to the latter. As gay and lesbian historians John D'Emilio and Estelle Freedman point out in their introduction to the groundbreaking book *Intimate Matters* (1988), there is a political ethics at the heart of radical history that seeks to untangle dominant stories from the lives that are diminished in their telling. Counterhistories thus speak of survival rather than deviance, of community rather than isolation. Those lives—or our glimpsing of them—spur a political energy in the present, at its best enabling a continuity of intellectual and political effort that for feminist historian Maria Brettschneider looks to “our foremothers for how they might still assist us in the heady work before us today” (2013, 648). For postcolonial queer theorist Anjali Arondekar (2009), the colonial archive hides secrets that may not be straightforwardly visible but that lurk in the interstices of dominant tales, the echoes of which we might catch if we pay close enough attention, a position reminiscent of lesbian feminist historian Blanche Wiesen Cook's injunction to “listen carefully” to the people one is writing about, who “intrude on the privacy of my bath, join me in the ocean and the garden . . . tell me stories, give me feedback, disagree, suggest new sources” (1984, 398).

There is a certain awkwardness in naming these different historians “feminist,” “postcolonial,” “lesbian and gay,” or “queer,” particularly in terms of their overlaps. But I do so to highlight the specific (and, to some extent, distinct) histories that similar understandings of the importance of “the object” emerge from. What they share is the wish to make visible different threads of meaning that ripple back and forward through time. Such approaches are a question of methodology as much as of theoretical framing or political epistemology. Intervening in dominant history to change our understanding of the past and present requires attention to different sorts of evidence but also importantly the development of a sixth sense beyond eyes and ears for grasping the gaps. In this light, the radical scholar's task is at once archaeological (unearthing the hidden to change our view of the earth) and interventionist—retelling

stories to allow for present living, in a process feminist literary historian Jane Marcus (1984) evocatively refers to as “invisible mending.” It seeks truth but revels in inevitable creative openness as both means and end of politicised historical endeavour.

As I hope is already evident, the story of these traditions of radical history can be told as one of care as well as desire: it uncovers different sources and approaches to the truth and promotes a different set of values. But herein also lies the danger, as many scholars have pointed out. With reclamation projects that emerge from a particular political standpoint in the present (as I would argue all history does whether visible or not), the investment in the subjects and objects of inquiry is likely to be hyperbolic, making visible the stakes in the process but also potentially ignoring aspects of the past that do not so easily fit. The longing for a point of identification, a history that animates the present, can paradoxically overstate differences between dominant and resistant lives and experiences, for example, or overread through an identity politics transferred from the present to the past. The critique of such projective identifications has itself been a burning source of energy for radical history and has tended to focus either on the problems of decontextualisation, where figures from the past are wrenched out of their context in order to provide political fodder in the present, or on the problems of identity politics tout court. And, indeed, this has been a thread in my own argument in this introduction. Thus Joan Scott (1999) critiques a version of feminist history that seeks women who can be framed as feminist in the past irrespective of their own paradoxical circumstances much as I do here, arguing forcefully for the critical value of “gender history” over “women’s history.” Gayatri Spivak (1988) famously highlights the problems of a postcolonial desire for a precolonial subaltern voice because of its easy resonance with nationalist commitments in the present. And in respect of sexual history, Laura Doan notes the problems of mobilising identity as if past and present structures of sexual meaning were the same, advocating instead both careful use of historical example and attentive queer methodology over presumption (2013, ix). As such theorists have shown, desire for reclamation in radical historical projects is thus one fraught with the risk of flattening out the very lives and relationships one wishes to breathe life into, as one forges a path back and forward with one’s eyes firmly set on the prize. And, indeed, as I have also argued, the temporality of such projects remains deadeningly linear, as the past becomes a repository for nostalgia in a dystopian account of inexorable loss, or for traces of hope made manifest in a utopian tale of eventual and inexorable progress (Hemmings 2011).

Yet as such thinkers also acknowledge but tend to de-emphasise, that drive to understand and represent the past through more than its dominant modes remains central as part of how we come to imagine a different present. All these scholars, myself included, act from a more or less tactical presumption that the relationship between the past and present could be understood differently, more fluidly, multiply, with different possible outcomes: in a sense, that is one of the central values of historical inquiry. Such faith in transformation and in tracing or imagining a past that can belong to a different future might be said to inaugurate any progressive historical project. Thus, even where unsettling refuses to reify a singular version of the past or present, the belief in alternate versions remains strong. This is, if you like, the paradox I hope to hold out as itself epistemologically and methodologically resonant through this book: that the pull of the corrective is necessary as a spur to a rooted political imagination, even at the moment of its displacement.²⁴ Certainly in respect of this book, while I hope to use Goldman's thinking and action as a way of unsettling queer feminist certainties in the present, I also necessarily privilege particular histories over a range of possible others in doing so: the obscured contributions of anarchist sexual politics; the lost traces of gendered critiques that distance themselves from named feminism; the long relationship between antinationalist struggles and the critique of the family form in Left social movements. While not necessarily linear in approach, such priorities nevertheless produce exclusions of emphasis. As Ferguson (2008) asks, for example, what difference would it make to contemporary political theory to foreground the ongoing histories of state and privatised violence in the suppression of social movements, an approach that becomes more visible when we take anarchism seriously? Or to restore to education theory the history of prefigurative knowledge production enabled by drawing a direct line between anarchist teacher Francisco Ferrer and epistemologist Michel Foucault? In my choice to prioritise *ambivalence* over other kinds of political knowledges and practices, histories that do not fit into these preoccupations are thus still likely to be sidelined, or will not be seen at all. Rather than seeking to include an ever richer, fuller range of threads in the hope of greater inclusion, however, my emphasis is on the dynamics that spur and emerge from my own theoretical and political preoccupations. In the process, my concern is precisely with the relationship between past and present, and past and present desires; with the inevitable partiality one encounters in the archive, and its often surprising resonance with our own lives.

In this approach I am influenced by a range of queer feminist historio-

graphic work that intervenes both in questions of representation (of marginal subjects and meanings, and of the past in its complex relation to the present) and by suggesting different temporalities and relational modes of historical exploration. The challenge to linear progress narratives is particularly intense contemporarily in the evocative work on queer temporalities, for example, which seeks to shift the dominance of heteronormative, reproductive time. Writers such as Heather Love (2007) and Elizabeth Freeman (2010) move on from earlier theorists of temporal limitation and sexual alterity such as Teresa de Lauretis (1994) or Judith Roof (1996), challenging linearity by suturing queer moments together from the scrap heap of history to form an atemporal collage (with overlapping and frayed edges) rather than a seamless narrative of queer identification.²⁵ This important work tends to be seen as a departure from the long tradition of feminist theoretical reflections on time, but I think this underestimates the creative nature of the latter. This work has sought not only to provide an alternative tradition to that of a patriarchal history of “great events” but also to interrupt those triumphalist narratives in a range of ways.²⁶ I am thinking here of the work of feminist historian Luisa Passerini, for example, who reflects on the importance as well as the impossibility of generational thinking in her classic text *Autobiography of a Generation* (1996). In weaving together her own and activists’ memories of 1968 in Italy, and connecting “personal and political testimony [with] . . . the scene of her psychoanalysis” (Baraitser 2012, 380), Passerini holds together contradictory voices that cannot be connected in a linear way.²⁷ Other feminist work on time has challenged a common fantasy that dominant time itself is in some way cleanly linear by focusing on the past as *always* radically unknowable (e.g., Felski 2002). Elizabeth Grosz’s work on time as felt rather than objectively graspable (1995), and on the glimpses of other temporalities attention to that feltness generates (2004), brings us back to the interest in atemporality and dissonance that marks more recent queer historiography. Importantly for me here, too, is the way in which this call-and-response across feminist and queer concerns with temporality challenges an easy separation between feminist and queer theory and history. As Wiegman (2014) insists, a presumption that the two are separated in temporal as well as theoretical terms, with queer theory coming after and displacing feminist theory, is both inaccurate and also productive of a queer fantasy of its own privileged transgressive capacities.²⁸ Taking this relationship seriously, however, raises some difficult questions about how to represent the overlaps and differences between these traditions. My hope is that through the book as a whole the different and related ways

in which I intend “feminist” and “queer” produce helpful resonances, even if what the terms denote remains less than clear. Across all this work, and what continues to appeal to me across its differences, it is the pull between the singular and the multiple, the corrective and the exploratory that enlivens historians’ concerns with charting new political futures.

The doing of radical history is an affectively saturated process for all who attempt it. As demonstrated at the outset of this introduction, political desire shapes our view of people and events from the past in both evident and subtle ways. It is thus highly appropriate that much feminist, queer, and postcolonial historiography focuses as much on the role of the “historian” as on “history,” or more precisely on the dynamic between subject and object. That attention is often as much on the “teller of tales” as it is on the historical context under consideration, and foregrounds the question of accountability for one’s forays into the archives. This is hugely important, and a major site of consideration in this project, as we have seen. Building on this work, I can interrogate the assumptions we have about both the past and the present: pulling the rug from under the feet of the confident queer feminist writing subject, lifting her into the air to perform a series of cartwheels, not knowing where she will land. Yet of course we might also say that there is a rather glaring irony in such a burden of responsibility for knowing the (ambivalent) present resting on the very writing subject who is seeking to challenge its knowability. As I wrote in an earlier article, thinking through the dynamic of my engagement with Goldman, I have been struck by how the burden of that work of accountability rests paradoxically enough with the one caught most fully in its bright lights (Hemmings 2013, 338). My increased insecurity about a correct relationship to the history I am tracing (Serisier 2012, 253) is matched by my sense that the contours of the present are never fully knowable either.

As Elisabeth Young-Bruehl thoughtfully suggests, the fact that subjectivity is involved in the process of writing about someone else does not mean that the encounter can be reduced to the needs and desires of the writing subject (1998, 8). To return to the question of Goldman’s own presence, then, the teller of tales is, I have found, never quite as in control of the stories she spins as she might hope. As I have indicated earlier, and want to underline here once again, Goldman herself is never only a figment of my imagination, moulded in my own image. She speaks back in the ways that those represented have a habit of doing: in her resistance that I feel in my belly, in the ways words or images will not bend to my interpretation, in the fervency of her own writing

that seeps into mine, so that at times I feel more like a fraudulent medium than a queer feminist theorist.²⁹ Or too in strange moments of being drawn back to a fragment of text or an image, starting from an imaginative connection that makes me want to be faithful to Goldman no matter how far removed from her I am. Young-Bruehl again helpfully advocates what she rather beautifully calls a “biographical tenderness” (23) in writing about past figures, one that attends to the ways they escape our control as well as the ways they overtake us. I am pulled back not only to the way that the present shapes our engagement with the past but also to how the past is felt in the present, is profoundly unruly and disruptive of the political and intellectual certainties I might otherwise wish I could preserve.

Thinking through the past and present as intimately related and yet unknowable draws me to psychoanalysis, that method of treatment that asks its patients to reflect on their past and the analyst to take (that) history into account (Phillips 2012). Psychoanalysis, as many queer, feminist, and postcolonial scholars have explored, foregrounds emotion and intersubjectivity as significant ways of knowing, as challenges to objectivist perspectives of control and mastery (Mitchell 1974; Stacey 2013b). Further, and importantly for this book, a psychoanalytic approach to history privileges the ways the present contains the past (in both senses of the word)—an approach that has been fundamental to the development of postcolonial understandings of the present (Gilroy 2004; Khanna 2012)—and the radical unknowability of *both* past and present (Felman 1977; Wiegman 2012). Most significantly, perhaps, psychoanalytic approaches to history and knowledge open up the possibility of glimpsing ambivalence indirectly through its effects and affects, rather than entertaining fantasies of final knowledge in empiricist vein (Weed 2014, 10).³⁰

Although this project does not take forward an exclusively psychoanalytic method, I have been strongly influenced by the rich work in psychoanalysis and history, particularly that which focuses on the question of fantasy in the dynamic between writer and historical figure.³¹ As Leo Spitzer notes in his recent work with Marianne Hirsch, we need to “take into account . . . the apprehension and misapprehension of events—[that] complicates and restores a measure of contingency to history” (Hirsch and Spitzer 2013, 192). But to push still further, one might say that what I have been describing thus far as “history as (a) dynamic” should not be understood as straightforward transference of present concerns onto an imaginary past but rather as transference of a *fantasy present* onto an imaginary past one has designs on. What one knows about the present is always partial, related to what one remembers

about the past and what one wants the future to look like. As Adam Phillips insists: “Memories always have a future in mind” (2005, 35), while for Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz “memory is active,” making and remarking the relationship between past, present, and future (2010, 3). For postcolonial psychoanalytic scholar Ranjana Khanna (2003), there is then a battle in the present over which future will dominate, which is always to say, which past. Thus, to reframe my earlier argument in more psychoanalytic terms, imagining a seamless move from past to present always risks ignoring the violence that inheres in (making real) our fantasies (Rose 1996). In my desire to rescue the present as well as the past through Goldman, I risk importing ideas and theories that we hope will finally resolve the complicated problems of difference and inequality we live in; a more accountable position may be to sit with those difficulties a while and tease out what cannot quite be grasped.

Fantasy and temporality can never be disentangled in psychoanalysis: the present is always bound up with what is remembered, half remembered, or forgotten in a series of loops or folds. This framing of forgetting as “an active process . . . designed to protect the subject” (Sturken 1997, 8) is one reason I am drawn to psychoanalytic understandings of the relationship between repression and complex histories. Importantly for my purposes too, this understanding of the relationship between present and past allows for creative reconfiguration: we may inhabit more than one role—mother, daughter, neither—and are not simply doomed to repeat cycles of repetition or origin stories (Jacobus 1995). As Jacqueline Rose indicates so suggestively: “Fantasy is also a way of re-elaborating and therefore of partly recognizing the memory which is struggling, against the psychic odds, to be heard” (1996, 5).³² What we obscure is, in this sense, surely as interesting for a queer feminist politics engaging Goldman as what we are delighted with. To consider history through memory’s turns as well as reclamation’s grasp in *Considering Emma Goldman*, then, is to foreground an understanding of the present as always containing multiple histories—visible and invisible—and our relationship to these histories as characterised by ambivalence rather than certainty (Berlant 2007).

But how can we address what hovers at the boundary between the known and the unknown in historical dynamics? How can we begin to think carefully about what we seem to want to forget? Can ambivalent knowledge ever truly be represented? There can be no direct access to the unconscious per se of course, but nevertheless in psychoanalysis the unknowable is insistent, speaks to us in narrative slips, half-remembered dreams, or, in Phillips’s evoc-

ative phrasing, the moments “when two people forget themselves in each other’s presence” (1996, 31). For some scholars, taking the unconscious seriously is less a question of evidence and more a question of methodology. Thus, Shoshana Felman (1977) advocates reading for ambivalence as a sign of the irresolution of conscious and unconscious forces, while Rose focuses on “moments when writing slips its moorings” such that otherwise precluded connections can be made (1998, 128). To turn to Scott again, she argues that the relationship that emerges between the historian and her subject can be read through disjuncture or incommensurability, through the “often chaotic interactions of past and present” (2012, 67), the misunderstandings of one another perhaps as well as the pleasure in forgetting the difference one from the other. Following Michel de Certeau, Scott suggests that we may be able to glimpse the workings of the unconscious through the uncanny, the irreducible dissonance of the historical encounter that no contextualisation can assuage: “that which historians know but must deny” (67). To return to Goldman, these psychoanalytic insights invite me to tease out what I know but must deny in my relationship to Goldman as I shuttle back and forth between past and present.

In an earlier section, “Feminist Attachments,” I foregrounded the importance of ambivalence in the Goldman archives (subjective and critical), as well as in the theoretical and imaginative archives I am also concerned with. I asked what was ignored or denied in the claiming of Goldman as a feminist, as an intersectional foremother or queer interlocutor. What kinds of histories are reproduced, invented, or precluded in bringing Goldman forward in our own image? What slips outside of my grasp, or is easily framed as someone else’s bad habit? And yet, what is it that I might want to push away, but which continues to insist, keeps on interrupting the neat narratives of self, theory, and politics I have a vested interest in? In methodological terms, it is my own affective response to the subjective archive that has opened up for me what I might know but (tend to) deny in relation to Goldman. I laughed uproariously at Goldman’s viciousness to women when I first encountered it in her writing, sharing nasty laughter at women’s manipulability and culpability for their own oppression. I have come to think of that pleasure as a way of letting my partner in crime carry the burden of our shared judgement of femininity; it lets me off the hook even as it binds me to Goldman. My initial response to Goldman’s understanding of race and racism in her work was also highly affective. I shared the critical disappointment at her lack of sustained theorising of race politics and found a firmer footing in reframing her as a prophetic in-

tersectional thinker instead. Yet something niggled at me, made me ashamed at my own displacement of race politics that seemed to mirror hers, even as I sought to distance myself from her in this regard. And finally, I wrestled for some time with my bodily glow at Goldman's sexual politics, her insistence on human capacity as generous rather than mean-spirited, trying to control that common joy by filtering her through a more sophisticated contemporary critical sieve. In so doing, the important temporality of Goldman's belief in human nature, a future orientation I was only able to glimpse when I gave in to that glow, eluded me. Much as one might apologise for a well-meaning but embarrassing relative in ways one later feels as a reciprocal humiliation, my own attempts to clean up Goldman could not be sustained: she kept jabbing at my ribs and stomach and in each case brought me back to her ambivalence as considerably more engaging than my own superficial certainties.

At this point in time, we have a veritable cornucopia of affect theories to draw on in validating bodily knowledge as an academic or political resource (Gregg and Selgworth 2010). My own position on affect has shifted over the years from one that was highly critical of the "affective turn" because of its consigning of feminist accounts of the body and feeling to the historical sidelines (Hemmings 2005), to one that is interested in affect as a source of knowledge that can take us in different directions to that provided by text or context (Hemmings 2011, 2012a). In line with Eve Sedgwick (2003), I am persuaded that attention to affect gives us a complex sense of the texture of life and has the capacity to transform both subject and object of knowledge in unexpected ways. Indeed, this is precisely my intention in thinking through affect as a way of foregrounding what might otherwise be forgotten in my relationship with Goldman. Where I still remain underwhelmed by "the affective turn" is at the point that theorists present it as running *counter* to the threads of social life that constrain and name (Massumi 2002), always interrupting and never consolidating, always excessive and never reductive. What affective purists might term my attachment to paranoid thinking, but which I prefer to think of as a healthy queer feminist suspicion of replacement orthodoxies, pushes me towards wanting a more restless theory of affect. Attention to affect most certainly provides a different way into the social, a way that might otherwise be overlooked; but for me, and where I depart, is that this attention is always interpretative. For me, the question of affect remains one of knowledge: What does feeling allow us to know or preclude us from knowing? Such an approach leaves open the possibility that affect is as likely to consolidate the status quo as it is to disrupt it. In this, I am entirely persuaded by the careful

work of Lauren Berlant (2011) in mapping the role of affect—or intimate attachments—in securing a set of failing capitalist promises, by Sara Ahmed’s (2004) analysis of the ways in which affect sticks negatively to some subjects and not others in line with historical and contemporary power relations, and by Avtar Brah’s (1999) work on affect as opening up imaginative possibilities that challenge as well as reinforce racial and ethnic difference in ethnography.³³ All three theorists value affect primarily for the ways in which it indexes historical memory and power and sutures individuals and collectives to positions they otherwise might loathe to adhere to. All three theorists also—and importantly—consider affect crucial as a way of imagining and feeling different histories, presents, and futures.

WRITING BACK

If the critical archive and my own attachments foreground the question of affect as a central part of a feminist politics of ambivalence, then the same is true of Goldman herself. As indicated earlier, Goldman’s own engagement with the world was marked through passionate attachments to both people and ideas, above all other considerations. In reading Goldman dynamically, as I hope to do, I am also drawn to her own engagements with others: in lectures, in published and unpublished writing, in letters, and in others’ representations of her. It is in her letters, in particular, that we see Goldman’s struggles with passion and politics, and that have also been most controversial. Letters and fragments of lectures or ephemera in the subjective Goldman archive also point me towards the role of fantasy and creativity not just in terms of role of the writer but also in terms of historical methodology; not just what and how we read and make sense of it but how we yearn for something more than the gaps in the archive. A yearning for differences that make living better haunts this project, but this is not only a question of finding lost traces or filling the inevitable gaps that pepper any history that seeks to make ambivalence visible and readable. This is true of all searches for lost traces conducted from a position of marginality, of course, but I am particularly concerned to think through methods of articulating what Saidiya Hartman (2008) renders as “speculative history” with respect to sexual politics and meaning in this project, because it is sexual freedom that is proposed as the antidote to external and internal constraints in the Goldman archive.

Telling stories about sexual history that foreground freedom over identity, or ambivalence over clear desire, will necessarily orient us towards different sources: those that are less valued as part of the historical record (diaries,

letters, autobiographies, fragments, ephemera) and those that scramble the relation between the public and private in their expression of uncertainty or conflict. Feminist and lesbian historians have explored letters in particular as a space within which different concerns can be aired and the complexity of unrecognised feelings sorted through (Faderman 2000; Freedman 1998). For Margaretta Jolly (2008), it is of paramount importance that women's letters should not be thought of simply as offering a glimpse into a private or personal life, however, but rather as spaces of intersubjective and relational engagement, as arenas of self-making and practicing, and thus more properly as sites for the *negotiation* of public and private meanings. While inevitably the use of letters as evidence might raise anxieties in the historian (and reader) that we are mining writers' words not meant to be seen or reproduced, I see them, following Jolly, less as "spontaneous outpourings of the true self" and instead as a "literary genre [that] shows us there is something expressive, excessive about all writing" (2008, 7).

I have found letters to and from Goldman particularly productive in this respect, and attention to these is woven through the book as a whole. Letters already formed part of the public record for Goldman, who asked friends to send her letters they had received from her to help her reconstruct her life when writing her autobiography (Tamboukou 2012).³⁴ And as Stansell notes, Goldman was writing her own explicit letters at a time when there was a bohemian culture of people passing letters around as part of the refusal of sexual secrecy: "Free love involved sex, of course, but it also signified talking and writing about it, a lively discourse of sexual conversation and revelation" (2000, 274). In both chapter 1 and chapter 3, I read Goldman's sexually explicit, demanding, and occasionally self-debasing letters to her lover and tour manager Ben Reitman as a way she represented and worked through some of her ambivalences about sexual politics and personal passion.³⁵ In chapter 2, letters continue to play a dual role, evidencing both the transnational dimensions of anarchist collectivities and the importance of personal attachments in fostering new understandings of kinship not based on blood or nation. The anarchist movement during Goldman's time was extremely international, and revolutionaries wrote to each other as part of engaging in a politics of translation, seeking to build a coordinated revolution to reshape the world (Anderson 2005). In this context, too, many anarchists were exiled (or self-exiled) from their home contexts and retained connections to family, friends, and comrades through copious letter writing across borders that they themselves were unable to traverse (J. Cohn 2014). Goldman's letters

to intimates demonstrate both more personal concerns (about health, love, the future of the movement) than we otherwise have access to and give us a clearer sense of her sticking points: they demonstrate profound ambivalence about homosexuality, for example, in ways that her few public statements do not. If we think of them as communicative testimony, letters can also reveal marginal history as a series of stutters and gaps in the archive. Letters may remain unanswered or be crossly returned, may reference other letters now lost, or present a partial and invested perspective that raises the spectre of their reception as we read them. Absence of reciprocation in love letters between women, for example, is evocative of a history of desire that is always open to interpretation; as Martha Vicinus reminds us, lesbian history “has always been characterised by a ‘not knowing’” (1994, 57). With this in mind, then, my interest in letters in this project is as much on the creative process of reading the lack of responses, the imagination of letters and reciprocation that is not in the archive, as it is in the material evidence that surviving letters represent.

Taking the idea of what is missing forward in more general methodological terms, gaps within any marginal history might be said to be constitutive of that history, of its secrets and half-buried violences and pleasures. This is no real surprise, as we know there are archival consequences to the history of legal sanctions on homosexuality, on birth control, on miscegenation or prostitution. Much has been destroyed, and not only by outside forces, as people struggle to survive and protect themselves from harm or retain unstable privileges. As Avery Gordon writes: “We’re haunted [by what] could have been and by the peculiar temporality of the shadowing of lost and better futures . . . sometimes as nostalgia, sometimes as regret, sometimes as a kind of critical urgency” (2011, 7). It is tempting indeed to want to fill these gaps, to find additional sources, and to write a counterhistory that displays alternative evidence for the skeptic. And in so doing, perhaps we also hope to displace those ghosts whose contours are impossible to delineate: now you see them, now you don’t. But the history of what has been buried is not simply a direct representation of a *relief*; it is not a Rachel Whiteread sculpture that gives shape to the space within, outside, or around the substantive. It is not directly represented in the formal archive, and so must be sought in the interstices of the text and context (Spivak 1999). It is tempting of course to try and recover the past in a form that reflects our current position, or even directly stands in its difference as a marker of how far we have come or what we have lost. But in seeking to fill the gaps, we run the risk of plastering over the cracks of meaning and struggle that are not only a failure to come into recognition

but also a legacy of the difficulty of struggle and meaning making. If we try to bring the buried truth of “historic alternatives” (Marcuse, in A. Gordon 2011, 7) into the present as part of a desired other legacy, we may ironically enough be enacting a representational violence of our own. As Gordon further explains, in hoping to rescue difference from the archive, we may end up less attuned to the ways that “abusive systems of power make themselves known and their impacts felt in everyday life, especially when they are supposedly over and done with” (2011, 2). While Gordon is talking here about the denial of the legacy of transatlantic slavery in a contemporary American political imaginary, her understanding of “haunting” remains more broadly relevant to an ethics and poetics of the dynamics of history (A. Gordon 2008). Her vision foregrounds the power relationships that make some memories traceable, while others are only barely perceptible: through a sixth sense, a frisson of fear, or the uncanny familiarity of new connection. Gordon’s work has always asked us to think about the shape of the buried knowledges and bodies whose graves remain unmarked. Tempting though it surely is, then, my concern in this project is less with a search for lost sources and more with how we might read these archival gaps and half-grasped traces creatively. The shift is slight, but important, I think. It frames the ambivalent histories we inherit as ones that were *always likely to have been lost*. This acknowledgement of the significance of loss is not intended to leave open the wounds of history but to approach them from a different angle. It brings to the fore the significance of the historian, or teller of tales, in being able to register those traces through their contemporary resonance: in her affect, her dynamic with the archives she creates, and through the sense that there is something hovering that cannot quite ever be known.

My interest in an imaginative archive that seeks to tell the unsayable and imagine what cannot be retrieved leans heavily on a history of postcolonial theory and fiction. Writers in this tradition insist that stories can and must be retold from the position of these gaps and fissures, but not in order to mend or simply include. Most famously, Jean Rhys in *Wide Sargasso Sea* (1966) retells *Jane Eyre* from the standpoint of the “madwoman in the attic,” and J. M. Coetzee (1986) reimagines Daniel Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe* from the perspective of Susan Barton, who joins Crusoe and the voiceless Friday on the infamous desert island, and whose experiences are distorted or erased by Defoe himself. More recently, Joan Anim-Addo (2008) rewrites Aphra Behn’s tale of Oroonoko from the point of view of his otherwise untraceable lover. These writers eschew a search for innocent origins or even reparation; these are renditions

of the violence of dominant narratives that leave space only for confusion or howls that fill the night air. And their protagonists have no time for identity or futurity. Theirs is a struggle to hold on, to reflect, and to survive. And while that struggle is always lost—both for them and for posterity—the ripples it makes continue to register at the level of *possibility*, if not reality.³⁶

Postcolonial thinkers in this vein do not ask us to reverse history, or simply value the downtrodden or obscured. Instead, they focus on our practices of reading, of attention to one thing and not another; they invite us to read against the grain. Saidiya Hartman (2002), for example, starts from her sense of loss at the lack of stories of resistance to slavery in the archives. Surprised—and a little irritated by her own surprise—at the archival reflection of a dominant order (since resistance was routinely met with deathly obliteration), Hartman refuses to deny that historical violence, or accept what she encounters as the whole story. Instead, she embarks on a historical journey that begins from her desire for other traces of meaning beyond the deafening archival silence: if she wants evidence of solidarity in the face of annihilation, then she will have to imagine it. Hartman throws us into the uncertain hum of plausible alternatives by imagining moments of encounter and futurity between two girls killed on an Atlantic slave trade ship. The archive has no details of their—or any—relationship between slaves, reflecting the girls' status as cargo, so for Hartman their story can only be glimpsed as we “strain . . . against [the] archive” (2008, 11) in order to be able to “imagine what cannot be verified” (12). Hartman's narration of the violence and death of these two girls is shot through with her painful imagination of other possible moments of recognition and intimacy not as a way of mediating that pain but as a way of reorienting her, and our, historical sensibilities.

This idea of *speculative history* qua Hartman is reflected in artistic and academic practices of meaning making that splice together fragments from the archive—bits and pieces that cannot be catalogued, are undated, unmatched, nonsensical—with creative interventions. The work of Cheryl Dunye and Zoe Leonard in *The Fae Richards Photo Archive* and its companion piece, the fake documentary *The Watermelon Woman* (Dunye 1996),³⁷ are particularly good examples of the power of the imaginative archive. *The Fae Richards Photo Archive* brings together staged photographic images to chart the life of the fictional protagonist of the same name, from the early twentieth century onwards. The archive shows her stereotyped roles in films (hence she becomes known as the “Watermelon Woman”), her participation in the civil rights movement, and her struggles in between. Dunye's film enacts a further twist,

in which Dunye herself plays an African American video store employee who is researching Richards's life and discovers a further lesbian (butch) reading of her (femme) desires. As Hartman does, so Dunye attributes her "falsification" of Richards's life story to the lack of any archival traces of this black femme starlet from the 1930s, commenting that "*The Watermelon Woman* came from the lack of any information about the lesbian and film history of African-American women. Since it wasn't happening, I invented it." Dunye-as-historian foregrounds the yearning of the contemporary queer subject for a past that she can claim, despite knowing that this will rely on fabrication of evidence. I prefer the term "speculative" to "falsified" here, however, precisely to highlight the believability of the narrative that eludes the historian's gaze, but which cannot not have been true.

My own aims in occupying the position of the imaginative historian are similar. I start from the letters that Goldman received from fellow anarchist activist and labour union organizer Almeda Sperry during 1912 and 1913. Sperry wrote a sequence of more than sixty seductive letters to Goldman, in which she depicts her frustration with small-town life and politics, her struggles with her husband, Fred, and her paid work for sex, as well as her desire for Goldman (which was temporarily reciprocated). There are no letters from Goldman to Sperry in the archive, and while I can entertain fantasies of their discovery in the attic of a distant relative of Sperry's, their loss is of course indicative. But as I read Sperry's letters to Goldman, I piece together their likely correspondence and enter a conversation between the two of them that reflects my own yearning for the letters that we do not have. In a fictional and political archival experiment, then, I write Goldman's letters to Sperry as chapter 4 of this book. In "A Longing for Letters," I use that reading dynamic as Dunye and Hartman do, as a springboard for imagining a past we do not have evidence of. I start from that yearning for those letters, both as a way of correcting assumptions about Goldman's heterosexuality—the critical archive tends to read *our* lack of evidence as *her* lack of desire—and as a way of imagining her pleasure and distance in relation to Sperry as filled with ambivalence. I start from the tension between wanting those letters and the knowledge that they not only have been lost but were, again, *always likely to have been lost*.

The letters I write back to Sperry seek to represent both aspects of her sexual politics that are part of the subjective archive, and aspects that elude us. I pore over Sperry's missives, taking in her frustration that Goldman has not written in ages, and her relief when she has received a letter. I can see that

the letters were there, that Sperry received them, but only faint clues emerge as to what they might have contained: declarations of love and impatience; political diatribes; shared reading and frustration. I am interested both in the complexities of her own desire as we encounter it and in the parts that cannot so easily be confronted: her disgust as well as her pleasure, her fear as well as fierce courage and pride. The history I imagine is not one with identity at its heart but one that queers both the Goldman archive and the critical archive that longs for a safe and knowable history. I write back to Sperry the letters I imagine Goldman writing when I read the ones we have, and in so doing I foreground both our collective failure to find them and the importance of still imagining them there. I am not prepared to read Goldman only through the traces that remain; instead, I want to bring to life a sexual history in which her own ambivalence, same-sex passion and disgust, fear and bravery must have crafted the words she wrapped around Sperry's heart. I write Goldman's letters back to Sperry as a kind of memory work that focuses on my own yearning for a stronger trace of her appetite and anger, and that I know I will not find except imaginatively. I do not want to clean Goldman up, or reject her for her contradictions. I want to think with and through Goldman towards an ethics of representation and political ambivalence that starts from my own yearning for something that "cannot be verified" and from my gut feeling Goldman would have been tickled pink by my presumption.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. One of these was my own article specifically on Goldman and sexual politics (Hemmings 2014b), while the other three reference her as part of other arguments. In more general terms, the same period also saw publication of a popular biography of Goldman (Gornick 2011a), an intellectual biography framing her within the tradition of American political theory (Chalberg 1991), and an analysis of her two-volume autobiography (Nicholson 2010). In addition, a range of articles across disciplinary sites engage centrally or tangentially with Goldman, and some less well-known or hard-to-obtain pieces of her oeuvre are being republished (e.g., “What I Believe,” in Loizidou 2013).

2. A notable strand of thought here is “post-anarchism,” which seeks to harness modern anarchist insights for understanding contemporary networks and power relations (beyond socialist or conservative alternatives) but which “rejects the epistemological foundations of ‘classical’ anarchist theories” (Springer 2012, 1618). Rouselle and Evren’s *Post-anarchism: A Reader* (2011) brings together the main thinkers in this subfield. For a useful critique of post-anarchist presumptions about the “essentialism” of classical anarchism, see Allan Antliff’s essay “Anarchy, Power and Poststructuralism” (2007).

3. I first raise the question of intimacy in secondary readings of Goldman in my article “Considering Emma” (Hemmings 2013). I extend this early reflection here with more sustained attention to Goldman’s own awareness of others’ readings of her.

4. Frankel (1996) charts representations of Goldman both at the time of her activism (in the media and among her peers) and through the twentieth century, helpfully identifying the growing feminist interest in her from the 1970s onwards.

5. Candace Falk is the director of the Emma Goldman Papers Project and has brought together the fullest archive of Goldman's work, her correspondence, published and unpublished writings, and ephemera. She is also the main editor of the three volumes of Goldman's writings while in America, *Emma Goldman: A Documentary History of the American Years*.

6. At the height of her popularity in America, Goldman commanded audiences in the thousands (Porter 2004–5). Falk notes Goldman's knowledge of the unusualness of (young) women speakers in the public sphere as part of her appeal, and the ways in which she used this to her advantage (Falk 2003, 13; 2005, 9). Similarly, Judy Greenway (2009b) notes that the association of anarchism with free love was also likely to result in large audiences coming to gawp at the prurient other. When Goldman returns to America in the 1930s the attendance at her talks of only several hundred is clearly framed as a mark of her failure (*New Haven Register* 1934).

7. As if to underline the point, note that both of my articles engaging this question have the same subtitle: "Emma Goldman's Passion."

8. In considering questions of gender, race, and sexuality as a question of "objects" and our vexed relationship to them, I have been strongly influenced by Robyn Wiegman's work in *Object Lessons* (2012). Wiegman's approach engages the desires that queer feminist critics have for their cherished objects, a process that invests them with magical properties they can never deliver on. In my own project, I am more concerned with charting a history of the ambivalence one needs to suppress in order to continue those desiring attachments.

9. The reader may have noticed that I alternate between describing this project and the theoretical and political terrain I am engaged with as "feminist," "feminist and queer," "queer and feminist," or "queer feminist" (among other juxtapositions). My use of these terms is also ambivalent, precisely because it is not always (ever?) entirely clear which subjects and objects are being denoted in this difference. Further, many scholars see themselves as both queer and feminist but nevertheless would want both terms included (rather than the one subsumed under the other). My difficulty in separating them out is a historiographic as well as definitional problem, in that the separation can often denote supersession as well as difference. My use of both is thus also intended to highlight in the text as far as possible that I think of "queer" and "feminist" as by turns indistinguishable, and as taking place in the same sphere, rather than as generationally divided (see also Hemmings 2016). In a more descriptive vein, we might say that feminist thinking is more prevalent in my first chapter on femininity and its discontents, while queer theory is more central to the third chapter on sexual freedom and the historical imagination. But even this is not fully accurate.

10. My thanks to one of the readers of the proposal and first draft of this project for insisting on the importance of the different archives that structure my inquiry. And I am grateful to both readers for their identification of the question of "political ambivalence" as the central feature of the project (which had somehow remained buried).

11. Much of the research for this project involved immersion in the *Emma Goldman Papers: A Microfilm Edition* (1991). This resource is the fullest collection of Goldman's published and unpublished work, letters to and from her, and federal government as well as news media commentary on her life and work. Where reference is made to materials from this source, the original date of publication provides the in-text citation, and the bibliographical reference locates the reel number. Additional sources—e.g., third-party correspondence and hard-to-find secondary criticism—were consulted at the Emma Goldman Papers Project at UC Berkeley.

12. It is Falk who describes Goldman's personal and political mode as one of "panache" (2002, 23). In this book's conclusion I explore the potential of considering panache as a political attitude well suited to a politics of ambivalence.

13. Farhand Rouhami (2012) and Martha Ackelsberg (2012) foreground the importance of prefiguration as part of anarchist revolutionary practice and frame it as the art of living now the future you are working to bring into being.

14. This term recurred in discussions at the two-day workshop "Anarchism and (Homo)sexuality" that took place at the London School of Economics in December 2014. My thanks to all the participants of that workshop for their intellectual enthusiasm, and particularly to my workshop co-organizer, Richard Cleminson.

15. There are of course a range of biographies and web-based introductions to her life and work, many of which are included in this book's reference list, and many articles or longer theoretical texts provide a "snapshot" of Goldman's life as part of their introduction. Such snapshots are never neutral, presenting us with a picture of a vibrant Goldman (Shulman 1982), an emotion-fuelled Goldman (Gornick 2011a), a hysterical Goldman (Herzog 2007), or a politically complex Goldman (Marso 2003) in ways that reflect the main arguments about the value of her thinking. The fullest *intellectual* biographical account of Goldman's years in America comes from Falk's extensive introductions to the three volumes of *Emma Goldman: A Documentary History of the American Years* (2003, 2005, 2012b).

16. Falk is unusual in remaining critical of what she sees as Goldman's flattening out of the differences between Russian and American repression in her critique of the Bolsheviks (2005, 15).

17. When Goldman was finally able to return—for a lecture tour in 1934—her expectations exceeded what her adopted home could deliver, of course. The press is filled with accounts of her ageing body and attitude, as well as the reduced crowds for an anarchist whose heyday is cast as long past.

18. In relation to the production/reproduction nexus, it is of course Friedrich Engels (1884) who is the early socialist reference point for consideration of women's labour as labour.

19. I began this work of challenging the ways sexuality is forced to carry the burden of a cultural/material opposition in theory and politics in chapter 3 of *Why Stories Matter* (2011) and have early reflections on Goldman's value in rethinking sexual history in my more recent piece for *Feminist Review* (2014b).

20. While none of Goldman's lectures on homosexuality remain, we know she was

one of the few anarchists who defended Oscar Wilde (Cook 1979a; Liesegang 2012, 89), and she viewed male homosexuality as a site of creativity and unnecessary oppression (Goldman 1931b, 269; Marso 2003, 318).

21. John D’Emilio’s foundational work “Capitalism and Gay Identity” very importantly challenges any easy separation of gay and lesbian identity developments from the emergence of modern capitalism, as he explores ways in which the “expansion of capital and the spread of wage labor” are “most directly linked to the appearance of a collective gay life” (1983, 102).

22. Stefan Dudink (2011) and Eric Fassin (2011) provide useful accounts of the controversial Amsterdam conference I am obliquely referring to here.

23. I use the term “postcolonial” here rather than “critical race” or “decolonial” in order to foreground the question of radical historical methodology. It is postcolonial critics such as Gayatri Spivak (1999) and Antoinette Burton (1999, 2001) who have focused most particularly on the vexed question of authenticity in the “recovery” of the past.

24. I am influenced here by Joan Scott’s (1996) other work on paradox as at the heart of any feminist project because of the pull to and away from identities formed in dominant discourse.

25. The contemporary work on queer temporality is consistently indebted to Ann Cvetkovich’s landmark book *An Archive of Feelings* (2003), in which the author challenges not only the contents of lesbian history but also its conventional methods. Jackie Stacey’s (2013a) account of queer temporality as part of how she situates her reading of Peggy Shaw in “Must” is particularly helpful in outlining the main strands of this body of thought.

26. Most famously, Julia Kristeva’s (1981) work “Women’s Time” suggests the importance of the embodied and the political in thinking genealogy and generation. Kristeva’s rather grand “matriarchal” alternative has been complicated by many thinkers, among them Barbara Taylor (1992), who counters and extends Kristeva’s view through thinking different modes of feminist temporality as simultaneous “impulses” rather than drawn-out teleological shifts.

27. Lisa Baraitser’s reflection is one of three for the *European Journal of Women’s Studies* on Passerini’s methodology in connecting feminist politics, history, and memory (Baraitser 2012; Peto 2012; Pravadelli 2012).

28. I borrow my use of the term “queer feminist” from Wiegman (2014), enjoying its challenge to that teleology and the way it opens up the possibility of being both at once.

29. Of course, juxtaposing fraudulent spiritual mediums and queer feminist history here references Sarah Waters’s narrative genius in *Affinity* (1999). Spiritualism and feminism have a long connection in fact; Elizabeth Lowry (2015) suggests we see this link as a radical interruption of attempts to control sexuality, gender, and race in a period of transformation.

30. Arabella Kurtz and J. M. Coetzee (2015) discuss the problem of narrative coherence and truth in their recent exchange. For both writers “the truth” is unknowable,

but a narrative resonance one can live with is imperative for any coherence (in analysis or in fiction).

31. The following section on psychoanalytic method is adapted from my article “Considering Emma” (2013, 339–40), which introduces the significance of these approaches.

32. Maria Sturken shifts away from memory tout court and towards what she terms “technologies of memory” (1997, 10), a framing that allows her to focus on “the stakes held by individuals and institutions in attributing meaning to the past” (9). For Sturken, memory and forgetting are thus always “questions of political intent” (9).

33. See also issue 100 of *Feminist Review*, which celebrated the journal’s birthday with responses to and engagements with Avtar Brah’s original article (Gedalof and Puwar 2012). Here affective attachment to Brah as the longest-standing member of the journal’s editorial collective produces an active space of feminist engagement and challenge.

34. As Betty Bergland argues, Goldman’s autobiography also refuses a separation between public and private spaces as sites of knowledge and politics (1994, 150).

35. Jacqueline Rose makes a similar point about letters for women—revolutionary and otherwise—in her recent book *Women in Dark Times* (2014), exploring the letters of Rosa Luxemburg, Marilyn Monroe, and Charlotte Salomon as part of how we need to engage women as complex resistant subjects.

36. In a different register, Cheryl McEwan suggests in “Building a Post-colonial Archive” (2003) that we should not look to store endless additional stories in stale institutional contexts but should instead seek to weave subaltern memories into cloth—so that they are useful and colorful and combine with all the other threads.

37. The archive can be visited at <http://www.archivesandcreativepractice.com/zoe-leonard-cheryl-dunye/> and consists of a series of staged images of Richards’s life, including butch-femme relationships.

CHAPTER ONE. WOMEN AND REVOLUTION

1. In 1939, the Los Angeles Liberation Committee published a seventieth birthday commemorative pamphlet for Goldman, which declares on its front cover “Emma Goldman, 70, Holds Fast to Anarchy” (LALC 1939, 1), underlining her commitment to anarchist struggle.

2. As a web supplement to her book *Emma Goldman: Political Thinking in the Streets* (2011b), Ferguson provides information on radical women contemporaries of Goldman largely obscured by history, lists of now defunct radical journals, and instances of violence against labour activists. I should also note here that Ferguson’s book has been an important text in the development of my own project. Her book is one of the few full-length engagements with Goldman as a thinker as well as activist or autobiographer, and Ferguson negotiates the sticky terrain of scholarly criticism on Goldman with enviable aplomb. See “A Companion Website to the Book” on the website of the Political Science Department, University of Hawai’i: <http://www.politicalscience.hawaii.edu/emmagoldman/index.html>.