"[T]hought-provoking. . . . [This book] give[s] us new insights. . . . Pickerill's analysis is straightforward, detailed, and persuasive." — Keith Whittington, University of Chicago Law Review
"[W]ell-written. . . . This book deserves serious attention by all public law scholars, political scientists more broadly defined, and politically active persons. The author provides the proper balance of case law with legislative history and quantitative analysis by employing appropriate conceptual approaches and methods. . . . Happily, this book is also a quick read that instructors may find as an appropriate addition to course syllabi for a wide range of political science courses." — Albert P. Melone , Law and Politics Book Review
"Pickerill has produced a very strong piece of careful and detailed political science scholarship. . . ." — Mark C. Miller , Judicature
“Legal scholars have recently questioned judicial review on the ground that constitutional deliberation should be returned to the people and their political representatives. Drawing from case studies of several federal statutes invalidated by the Supreme Court, Mitch Pickerill thoughtfully suggests that serious constitutional discourse in the legislature is unlikely unless the Court continues to exercise its power of judicial review. I found his argumentation persuasive as well as informative. Constitutional Deliberation in Congress is well worth reading by lawyers as well as by students of American government.” — William N. Eskridge Jr., Yale Law School
“Constitutional Deliberation in Congress brings to light important new evidence regarding how Congress and the Court relate to one another in constitutional cases, and it provides the first high-quality and systematic examination of how Congress responds to judicial invalidations of its legislation.” — Keith Whittington, Princeton University